Randomization and Dynamic Consistency by Kelsey, David et al.
Randomization and Dynamic Consistency
Jürgen Eichberger
Alfred Weber Institut,
Heidelberg University.
Simon Grant
Research School of Economics,
Australian National University
and
School of Economics,
University of Queensland.
David Kelsey
Department of Economics,
University of Exeter.
1st August 2015
Abstract
Rai¤a (1961) has suggested that ambiguity aversion will cause a strict preference
for randomization. We show that dynamic consistency implies that individuals will be
indi¤erent to ex-ante randomizations. On the other hand, it is possible for a dynamically-
consistent ambiguity averse preference relation to exhibit a strict preference for some ex-
post randomizations. We argue that our analysis throws some light on the recent debate
on the status of the smooth model of ambiguity We show that this rests on whether the
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
But why did big shareholders not move to stop over-leveraging before it reached
dangerous levels. Why did legislators not demand regulatory intervention? The
answer I believe is that they had no sense of Knightian uncertainty. So they had
no sense of the possibility of a huge break in housing prices and no sense of the
fundamental inapplicability of the risk management models used in the banks.
Risk came to mean volatility over the recent past.
Edmund Phelps, Financial Times 12th May 2007
An ambiguous uncertainty (also known as Knightian Uncertainty) is one for which objective
probabilities are not available and individuals cannot or do not assign (conventional) subjec-
tive probabilities. As the above quote shows, many economists believe that ambiguity has an
important role in nancial crises. Ambiguity is also believed to play a central role in entre-
preneurship, Knight (1921), and macroeconomic instability, Keynes (1936). Ellsberg (1961)
argued that individuals would behave di¤erently when faced with ambiguous uncertainties.1
At the same time, a number of economists have maintained that ambiguity will not give rise
to observable di¤erences in behaviour. A leading example is Rai¤a (1961). We shall illustrate
Rai¤as argument in the context of a variant of the 3-colour Ellsberg problem.2 Consider an
urn containing one hundred balls, thirty-three of which are red, while the remaining sixty-seven
balls are black and yellow in unknown proportions. One ball is to be drawn at random from
the urn. Let R, (respectively, B or Y ) denote a beton red (respectively, black or yellow)
which pays $100 if a red (respectively, black or yellow) ball is drawn from the urn and $0
otherwise. Furthermore, let R, (respectively, B or Y ) denote a betagainst red (respectively,
black or yellow) which pays $0 if a red (respectively, black or yellow) ball is drawn from the
urn and $100 otherwise. Reasoning analogous to that of Ellsberg (1961) suggests that many
individuals might prefer bets where probabilities are more precisely dened and hence display
the preferences R  B and R  B.
1Numerous experiments have conrmed this observation; Camerer and Weber (1992), Trautmann and van de
Kuilen (2015).
2Rai¤a (1961) considers the original composition of the Ellsberg urn with 30 red balls and 60 balls which
were either black or yellow. Unlike the standard 3-colour Ellsberg urn, in the modied example, slightly less
than one third of the balls are red.
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In his reply to Ellsberg (1961), Rai¤a (1961) tries to convince people of the reasonableness
of the axioms of Savage (1954). For this purpose, he asks the reader to consider two options, A
and B, which condition the choice of the Ellsberg acts on the outcome of a fair coin ip (Rai¤a
(1961), p. 694). Denote by CfhgD a randomization between a bet C and a bet D corresponding
to the conditional bet: bet on colour C if the ipped coin comes up heads, otherwise bet on
colourD. Option A corresponds to the act Rfhg R and Option B to the act Bfhg B: Behaviour as
observed in the Ellsberg paradox, R  B and R  B; would suggest that Option A dominates
Option B, while accounting by analyzing the implications of the options conditional on the
colour of the withdrawn ball(Rai¤a (1961), p. 694) shows that, for each colour drawn from
the urn, the outcome is one of the lotteries 100fhg0 or 100ftg0. For a fair coin, one obtains
the same lottery conditional on each colour. Hence, in Rai¤a (1961)s opinion, this reasoning
should lead everyone to assert that options A and B are objectively identical!(p. 694).
Though Rai¤a (1961) compares two randomizations, Option A and Option B, using his
accounting by analyzing the implicationsit is easy to interpret the preferences of an ambiguity
averse agent as a preference for randomization. If the individual makes her choice on whether
to bet on either a black or a yellow ball, conditional on the ip of a faircoin, BfhgY , then the
(overall) probability of winning is 67=200, independent of the actual proportion of black and
yellow balls in the urn. Hence, she is facing only conventional risk. This would seem to suggest
that ambiguity aversion causes individuals to strictly prefer such a randomization to the pure
bet R which yields a winning probability of 33=100 and, hence, to the two pure ambiguous acts
B or Y as well.
1.2 Ex-Ante versus Ex-Post Randomizations
Rai¤as argument does not appear to make a clear distinction between ex-ante and ex-post
randomizations, that is, whether the coin is ipped before or after the ball is drawn from
the ambiguous urn. On the one hand, the argument that the individual should ip a coin
to determine whether to bet on B or Y seems to imply an ex-ante randomization. On the
other hand, the claim that the individual faces the same lottery regardless of the proportion
of black and yellow balls, suggests an ex-post randomization is intended. It is quite possible,
however, that an individual might react di¤erently to ex-ante and ex-post randomizations,
Saito (2013). An individual who followed subjective expected utility theory (henceforth SEU)
would be indi¤erent between the two. However this does not necessarily extend to preferences
which are non-linear in the probabilities.
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We study these issues in more detail using a model which makes a clear distinction between
ex-post and ex-ante randomizations. The model makes explicit the timing of randomizations
and state uncertainty. We show that dynamic consistency with respect to ex-ante randomiza-
tions implies indi¤erence to randomization. In many respects our argument is quite general.
We use a Savage framework. Apart from this, our results are model free in the sense that they
do not assume any particular functional form for preferences.
The relation between dynamic consistency and preference for randomization may be ex-
plained intuitively as follows. Assume the decision maker is initially indi¤erent between a pair
of ambiguous acts a and b. Let d be an act formed by taking an ex ante  : (1  ) randomiza-
tion of a and b and suppose that she prefers d to both a and b. Let c be a constant act which
is strictly preferred to a and b but is strictly inferior to d. Then before the randomization the
individual prefers d to c. However, after she learns the outcome of the randomizing device she
will be holding either a or b, both of which she views as inferior to c. This is a clear violation
of dynamic consistency.
We shall argue that indi¤erence to randomization is especially intuitive when the result of
the randomization is made known to the individual before the resolution of the ambiguous bet.
Assume the decision maker dislikes the acts a and b due to ambiguity. We argue that it is
implausible that ipping a coin before the uncertainty is resolved will make these acts more
attractive. After the ip, the decision maker remains exposed to either the ambiguous bet a
or the ambiguous bet b as determined by the coin.
We believe that some recent controversies may be claried by paying attention to this
distinction. As an illustration we consider the debate about the status of the smooth model of
ambiguity by Epstein (2010) and Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2012) in section 4. A key
issue in this discussion is the value of diversication. We show that diversication is valuable
if it is achieved by ex-post randomization but using ex-ante randomization will not diversify
ambiguous risks.
1.3 Previous Literature
This paper builds on our previous research. Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) showed that in
the convex capacity model of Schmeidler (1989), there is a strict preference for randomization
in the context of the Anscombe-Aumann (henceforth AA) framework, where outcomes are
lotteries and so randomizations take place after the realization of the subjectively uncertain
state. The preference for randomizations vanishes provided outcomes and acts are modelled in
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the Savage framework. To the contrary, this model implies that decision makers are indi¤erent
to randomization.3
Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) also show that in the maxmin expected utility (MEU) model
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), individuals may (or may not) have a strict preference for ran-
domization. Klibano¤ (2001) presents a preference-based notion of stochastically independent
randomizing device. He shows that this notion is not compatible with representing beliefs by
a convex capacity. In his view, MEU provides a better theory of ambiguity aversion since a
preference for randomization remains a possibility.
These di¤erences in preferences about ambiguous acts in the AA and Savage frameworks
suggest that the sequence of the realizations of the outcomes of the randomizing device and
the states matters. We argued above that Rai¤a (1961) is assuming that the realization of the
randomizing device comes rst. In the AA framework, the randomizations are treated as a
mixture of lotteries which take place state-wise and hence, after the realization of states. This
point has also been made in a context without ambiguity by Kreps (1988) and, more recently,
with ambiguity by Seo (2009) and Wakker (2010).4 While Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
introduce this interpretation of a randomization over acts as an explicit assumption, most of
the subsequent literature takes this interpretation as an unquestioned characteristic of the AA
approach itself.5
Organization of the paper In the next section we present our framework. Section 3
contains the main results on attitudes to ex-post and ex-ante randomization. We then apply
them to the debate between Epstein (2010) and Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2012) in
section 4. Section 5 relates our results to the recent literature and Section 6 concludes.
2 Framework and Denitions
There is a decision maker who faces uncertainty described by a nite state space S. A generic
state is denoted by s. She also has access to a randomizing device with which she may conduct
an ex-ante randomization before the state is revealed and/or an ex-post randomization after
the state is revealed. The two randomizing devices are assumed to have objective probabil-
ity distributions, which are known to the decision-maker. This is in the spirit of the Rai¤a
argument. These probability distributions are identically distributed and are (statistically) in-
3See also the discussion in Ghirardato (1997).
4See in particular Wakker (2010) sections 4.9 and 10.7.
5Anscombe and Aumann (1963) p. 201, Assumption 2 (Reversal of order of compound lotteries).
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dependent of one another. We study whether she would wish to make use of either the ex-ante
or ex-post randomization or both.
2.1 Uncertainty and Time
There are three time periods. In the rst, the outcome of a randomizing device r contained
in the sample space R = [0; 1] is revealed. Without essential loss of generality, we assume the
outcome of this randomizing device is distributed uniformly over the unit interval. A risky
event is an element of B, the Borel -algebra of subsets of [0; 1], and we let  denote Lebesgue
measure on B: For each B 2 B, the probability that the realization r of the randomizing device
is in the event B, is given by  (B). We say an event C 2 B is null if  (C) = 0. Let R  B
denote the set of non-null or relevant events. We assume that all randomizations are conditional
on non-null events. In the second time period, a possibly ambiguous state, s 2 S, is revealed.
Finally the outcome of a randomization device, identically and independently distributed to
the rst, t 2 T is realised in the third time period.
The grand state space is a Cartesian product 
 = RST . This is a complete description
of how all uncertainty is resolved. Once r, s and t are known there is no further uncertainty.
This framework allows us to distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post randomizations.
The space of outcomes, X, is a connected subset of R. An act is function, a : 
! X. (For
simplicity, we assume that the pay-o¤s of acts are expressed in utility terms.) The set of all
acts is denoted by A (
). The decision maker has preferences represented by a binary relation,
%, on A (
), which we take to be complete and transitive.
A constant act is one which assigns the same outcome x 2 X, to every triple (r; s; t) in 
.
Let A (R), A (S) and A (T ) be the subsets of A (
), given by
A (R) =

a 2 A (
) : 8r 2 R;8s^; ~s 2 S;8t^; ~t 2 T; a  r; s^; t^ = a  r; ~s; ~t	 ;
A (S) =

a 2 A (
) : 8r^; ~r 2 R;8s 2 S;8t^; ~t 2 T; a  r^; s; t^ = a  ~r; s; ~t	 ;
and A (T ) = fa 2 A (
) : 8r^; ~r 2 R;8s^; ~s 2 S;8t 2 T; a (r^; s^; t) = a (~r; ~s; t)g :
The acts in A (S) only depend on the resolution of the state uncertainty and are independent
of the outcomes of the two randomizations. These are the acts in which the decision-maker
is primarily interested. The randomizing devices are only present to help him/her if required.
We shall denote generic elements of A (S) by f; g; h (alluding to Savage acts that involve only
the resolution of purely subjective uncertainty). When convenient we shall abbreviate f (r; s; t)
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to f (s), for f 2 A (S) :
We shall denote generic elements of A (R) by `; ~`; ^` and generic elements of A (T ) by ; ~; ^
(alluding to lotteries with objectiveprobabilities) and again when convenient we shall abbre-
viate ` (r; s; t) to ` (r) for any ` 2 A (R) and  (r; s; t) to  (t) for  2 A (T ).
2.2 Randomization
In this section we dene ex-ante and ex-post randomizations. We then proceed to describe the
related concept of a subjective mixture of two Savage acts.
First we dene an ex-ante randomization between acts f and g to be a contingent plan
in which the act f or g is chosen depending on the outcome of the randomizing device. For
instance if the randomizing device is a fair die one could consider a plan to choose f if the die
shows 1; 2; 3 or 4 and g if it shows 5 or 6:
Denition 2.1 (Exante randomization) Suppose f ,g 2 A(S) and C 2 R, dene the act
fCg by fCg (r; s; t) = f (s) if r 2 C, and fCg (r; s; t) = g (s) if r =2 C.
Analogously one may dene an ex-post randomization.
Denition 2.2 (Expost randomization) Suppose f ,g 2 A(S) and D 2 R, dene the act
fDg by fDg (r; s; t) = f (s) if t 2 D, and fDg (r; s; t) = g (s) if t =2 D.6
Next we dene attitudes to randomization. We say that an individual is indi¤erent to
randomization if whenever (s)he is indi¤erent between a pair of acts f; g; she also views f as
being indi¤erent to any randomization between f and g:
Denition 2.3 (Indi¤erence to randomization) An individual is indi¤erent to ex-ante (resp.
ex-post) randomization if for all C 2 R, such that  (C) 2 (0; 1), and all f ,g 2 A (S), f s g
implies, fCg s f , (resp. fCg s f).
We say that an individual has a strict preference for randomization if there exist two indif-
ferent acts f; g such that some randomization between them is preferred to either of the original
acts. The reason we do not require a strict preference for all randomizations between indi¤erent
acts, is that the Rai¤a argument only applies to complementary acts such as betting on the
6The ex-post randomizations in this framework may be identied with a subset of the horserace-lottery acts
in the AA framework. In particular, the ex-post randomization fDg may be identied with the horserace-
lottery act H where for each s in S, H (s) =  (D) f(s)+(1   (D)) g(s) and x is the degenerate lottery that
yields the outcome x with probability 1. That is, an ex-post randomization can be naturally identied with a
horserace-lottery act in which the second stage is a binary lottery.
6
red or black balls from the same Ellsberg urn. Rai¤as intuition does not obviously extend to
non-complementary acts such as betting on the black balls from two di¤erent Ellsberg urns.
Denition 2.4 (Preference for randomization) An individual exhibits a strict preference
for ex-ante (resp. ex-post) randomization if there exists C 2 R, such that  (C) 2 (0; 1), and
9f ,g 2 A (S) such that f s g and fCg  f , (resp. fCg  f).
Wemaintain throughout the analysis that the decision maker does not discriminate between
lotteries over certain outcomes, which have the same cumulative distribution function, whether
they are resolved before or after the subjective uncertainty.7 An implication of this is that a
gamble which pays $100 if a fair coin shows heads, $30 otherwise; is viewed as equivalent to a
gamble which pays $100 if a fair die comes up 4, 5 or 6 and $30 otherwise.8 This is captured
in the next assumption.
For any ` 2 A (R), let F` : X ! [0; 1] denote the cumulative distribution function associated
with this lottery. That is, for any x 2 X, F` (x) =  (fr 2 R : ` (r) 6 xg). Similarly, for any
 2 A (T ), let F : X ! [0; 1] denote the cumulative distribution function associated with .
Assumption 2.1 (Distribution Invariance)
1. For any ` 2 A (R) and any  2 A (T ), F` = F ) `  ;
2. if a; b 2 A (
) are such that 8r 2 R, 8s 2 S, Fa(r;s;) = Fb(r;s;) then a s b:9
Notice in particular, part 2 of distribution invariance implies that for any pair of lotteries
; ~ 2 A (T ), if F = F~ then   ~. Given the transitivity of indi¤erence, it also readily
follows that for any pair of lotteries `; ~`2 A (R), if F` = F~` then `  ~`. Hence preferences do
not depend on the particular randomizing device used. Any randomizing device with the same
probabilities will give rise to the same preference.
We dene a subjective mixture of two acts as follows.
Denition 2.5 (Subjective mixture of acts) For any pair f , g 2 A(S) and E  S, the
subjective mixture of f and g; is an act fEg 2 A (S) dened by fEg (s) = f (s) if s 2 E and
fEg (s) = g (s) if s =2 E.
Thus the subjective mixture of f and g coincides with f if s is in the uncertain event E
and coincides with g otherwise. We say an event E  S is null if gEf  f for all f; g 2 A (S).
Let N denote the set of null subsets of S.
7This can be seen as a weak version of the AA reversal of order assumption, which only applies to acts which
are independent of the S-states.
8This assumption is similar in spirit to the device independence assumption in Eichberger and Kelsey (1996).
9If a 2 A (
) then for given r; s; a (r; s; ) is an act whose outcome only depends on the ex-post randomizing
device and hence may be described by a distribution function Fa(r;s;):
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2.3 Assumptions
If one imposes dynamic consistency and consequentialism globally then one rules out ambiguity-
aversion and indeed most preferences other than SEU. However there are ambiguity-averse
preferences which satisfy dynamic consistency and consequentialism with respect to a specic
ltration, Sarin and Wakker (1998) and Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2005). We take this
ltration to be the one in which the ex-ante randomisation is resolved rst, then the state-
uncertainty and nally the ex-post randomisation.10
2.3.1 Dynamic Consistency
We assume that in addition to the unconditional preference % on A (
), there is, for all (non-
null) events C 2 R, a conditional preference %C dened on A (
). We say preferences are
dynamically consistent with respect to the ex-ante randomization if the following holds.
Assumption 2.2 (R-dynamic consistency) For any relevant event C 2 R :
(i) if  (C) = 1, then %C= %;
(ii) if  (C) < 1, then for any pair of acts a; b 2 A (
): a %C b and a %RnC b implies a % b.
Part (i) of R-dynamic consistency says that if C is sure to occur then the conditional
preference should be the same as the unconditional preference. As is standard, part (ii) of R-
dynamic consistency says that an individual who conditionally expresses a preference between
two acts whether or not the randomization based on R yields a realization in the event C,
should also unconditionally express that preference. This is a weak dynamic consistency axiom
since it only requires consistency after observing a non-null event of R:11
2.3.2 Consequentialism
The next assumption states that preferences over ex-ante randomizations satisfy a weak version
of consequentialism.
Assumption 2.3 (R-consequentialism) For any C 2 R and any f; g 2 A (S), f C fCg.
10Since we use a specic ltration our axioms are not symmetric between the ex-post and ex-ante random-
izations.
11In this sense it may also be viewed as a weaker form of the coherence condition of Skiadas (1997),
expression (6) p.353.
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This assumption requires that the conditional preference %C only depends on the outcomes
in CST . Hence R-consequentialism may be viewed as a weak version of consequentialism in
the sense that it only applies to events dened by the ex ante randomizing device. In particular
it does not exclude possible violations of consequentialism due to ambiguity.
2.3.3 Independence of the Randomizing Devices
In the Rai¤a argument the randomizing device does not a¤ect anything the decision-maker
cares about. It is there to help him/her. Hence it should be independent of the process which
determines the ambiguous states. The next assumption captures these ideas formally. In our
opinion, the key features of an independent randomizing device are that its output conveys no
useful information about the likelihood of the states and that the decision maker does not care
directly about the outcome of the device. We believe that for acts which only depend on the
S states, preferences conditional on events dened by the randomizing device should coincide
with the unconditional preference.
It is logically possible that preferences might depend directly on the outcome of the random-
izing device even though it is independent of the state-uncertainty. For instance an individual
may be more willing to accept an ambiguous risk if her lucky number comes up. The Machinas
Mom example, concerning the allocation of an indivisible treat, is another case where the con-
ditional preference may depend on the outcome of an independent randomizing device, see
Machina (1989). The following assumption rules out such preferences, thus focusing our model
on the use of randomization to hedge ambiguity.
Assumption 2.4 (R-independent randomizations) For any relevant event C 2 R, and
any f; g 2 A (S), f % g , f %C g.
2.3.4 Ambiguity-Aversion
The following assumption says that the decision-maker is ambiguity-averse in the sense that
there is at least one occasion in which (s)he expresses the usual preferences in the two-ball
Ellsberg paradox. It says that there exists an event E  S; such that the decision-maker is
indi¤erent between betting on E and its complement. However (s)he views both of these bets
as being strictly inferior to a bet with probability 1
2
with the same prizes.
Assumption 2.5 (Ellsberg Ambiguity-Aversion (EAA)) A decision maker with prefer-
ences % on A(
) is Ellsberg ambiguity-averse if, for some (non-null) event E =2 N and some
event C 2 B, such that  (C) = 1
2
and some pair of outcomes x  y, xCy  yCx  xEy  yEx.
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Notice that the indi¤erences xEy  yEx and xCy  yCx for some x  y , suggests the
decision maker views both the eventsRET andRSC as equally likely as their respective
complements. If the decision-maker were probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina
and Schmeidler (1992) this would require an indi¤erence between the act xEy and the lottery
xCy. Instead the lack of indi¤erence indicates a strict preference of the decision maker to prefer
the two-outcome symmetric lottery rather than two-outcome symmetric Savage acts.12 The
opposite preference could be taken as a characterization of ambiguity-loving behaviour.
3 Attitudes to Randomization
3.1 Ex-ante Randomization
Our main motivation is to study ex-ante randomizations with known probabilities, which is
the case suggested in Rai¤a (1961). Suppose the randomizing device is a fair coin, hence
R = fr1; r2g ; where r1 and r2 are equally likely.13 The spirit of the Rai¤a argument seems to
suggest that if f; g 2 A (S) are ambiguous bets on complementary events such that f s g then
f r1g  f and f r2g  f: In other words both f if heads g if tailsand f if tails g if headsare
preferred to f: Our rst result says that it cannot be the case that the decision-maker always
prefers randomizations. If f and g are indi¤erent and some randomizations are preferred to
the pure acts there must be other ex-ante randomizations which are not superior to the pure
acts.14
Proposition 3.1 Let

% , %C : C 2 R	 be a family of conditional preference orders that satis-
es R-dynamic consistency (2.2) and R-consequentialism (2.4). Consider a given event C 2 R
and two acts f; g 2 A (S) such that f s g, if fCg  f then f % gCf .
Proof. Suppose, if possible, f %RnC g: Then by R-dynamic consistency f %C f and f %RnC g
would imply f % fCg, which contradicts the assumption that fCg  f: Hence we must have
g RnC f:
12This may be viewed as a special case of issue preference, as in Ergin and Gul (2009), or source dependence,
as in Chew and Sagi (2008).
13This can be made compatible with our assumption that the R-space is a continuum by identifying r1 with
0; 12
  R; and r2 with   12 ; 1  R:
14One may nd this result less compelling in a normative sense than a strict preference which violates dynamic
consistency. If preferences satisfy an appropriate continuity property, however, then we can construct a violation
of dynamic consistency which only involves strict preferences. The argument in the introduction provides an
outline of the proof.
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Notice that R-consequentialism implies f sRnC gCf; which together with g RnC f implies
g RnC gCf: A second application of R-consequentialism implies g sC gCf: Applying R-
dynamic consistency to g RnC gCf and g sC gCf; we may deduce g % gCf . However, by
assumption f s g so we may conclude that f % gCf .
An implication of this is that the decision-maker must be indi¤erent to all 50:50 random-
izations. More generally it is not possible to have a strict preference for ex-ante randomization
and distribution invariance at the same time, that is, Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 imply
indi¤erence to randomization.
Proposition 3.1 does not make use of R-independent randomizations, (2.4). If we add
this to our previous assumptions we can deduce that preferences must exhibit indi¤erence to
randomization.
Proposition 3.2 Let

%;%C : C 2 R	 be a family of conditional preference orders that satis-
es R-dynamic consistency (2.2), R-consequentialism (2.3) and R-independent randomizations
(2.4). Then the unconditional preference order % must be indi¤erent to R-randomization.
Proof. Fix a pair of acts f; g 2 A (S) such that f  g and a C 2 R. Then f  g ) fCg C f ,
by R-consequentialism. Also f  g ) f RnC g; by R-independent randomizations. Now
f RnC g ) f RnC fCg, by R-consequentialism. But if fCg C f and fCg RnC f then by
R-dynamic consistency fCg  f . Hence we have shown f s g implies fCg  f for all non-null
C $ R, and thus % is indi¤erent to randomization.
The proof does not use the full strength of the dynamic consistency assumption but only
applies it to indi¤erences. Proposition 3.2 does not assume beliefs over the S-space are ambigu-
ous. Hence it also applies to some non-expected utility preferences which are probabilistically
sophisticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler (1992). Its proof also does not exploit
the fact that beliefs about the randomizing device are additive (and that the preferences satisfy
Distribution Invariance (A. 2.1)). Hence even if an ambiguous randomizing device is available,
the decision maker would not wish to use it.15 None of the results in this section assume am-
biguity aversion. Thus ambiguity-loving individuals who satisfy our assumptions will also be
indi¤erent to randomization.
15Bade (2011) makes a related point. She shows that, in a strategic setting, an ambiguous randomizing device
would not help a player in a game. In her model the equilibria with ambiguous randomizations coincide with
conventional Nash equilibria.
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3.2 Ex-post Randomization
In this section we show Ellsberg Ambiguity-Aversion (A.2.5) and Distribution Invariance
(A.2.1) imply a strict preference for ex-post randomization. Suppose that one takes a ran-
domization over AA acts as a state-wise randomization over the outcome lotteries, as almost
all of the literature does. Then ambiguity-aversion implies that there exist ex-post randomiza-
tions that are preferred to the ambiguous act itself. In particular, a decision maker who prefers
to bet on the unambiguous urn as described in Ellsbergs two-colour urn (Ellsberg (1961)) will
prefer some ex-post randomization.
As the next proposition shows, in conjunction with Distribution Invariance, such an indi-
vidual will exhibit a strict preference for some ex-post randomization over some pairs of acts
in A (S).
Proposition 3.3 Let % be a preference on A (
) that satises Assumptions 2.1 (distribution
invariance) and 2.5 (Ellsberg ambiguity-aversion). Then there exists a relevant event D 2 R,
and a pair of acts f and g in A (S), such that fDg  f  g.
Proof. Since the agent is Ellsberg ambiguity-averse, there exists an event C 2 R with  (C) =
1
2
; a non-null event E =2 N and some pair of outcomes x  y, such that xCy  yCx  xEy 
yEx. Set f := xEy and g := yEx. Consider the ex post randomization fCg :
fCg  (xEy)C (yEx)  (xCy)E (yCx) :
By applying Assumption 2.1, it follows that fCg = (xCy)E (yCx)  (xCy)E (xCy) = xCy 
xEy = f .16 Hence fCg  f , as required.
Theoretical arguments based on hedging between complementary acts imply that individ-
uals are likely to have a strict preference for ex-post randomization, Schmeidler (1989). It is
an empirical question whether people will actually prefer ex-post randomizations.
3.3 Multiple Priors
This section contains an example of preferences which satisfy R-dynamic consistency, R-
consequentialism and Ellsberg Ambiguity Aversion. They exhibit indi¤erence to ex-ante ran-
domization but a strict preference for ex-post randomization. This demonstrates that our
16The indi¤erence (xCy)E (yCx) s (xCy)E (xCy) arises because  (C) = 1=2 implies that (xCy) and (yCx)
give the same outcomes with the same probabilities. Intuitively they should be indi¤erent conditional on Ec:
Indi¤erence is implied by Assumption 2.1 which says objective randomizations with the same probabilities
are indi¤erent and if they have the same conditional probabilities they are indi¤erent in the corresponding
conditional preferences.
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axioms are mutually consistent. The preferences in the example have the recursive multiple
priors form with rectangular beliefs. These are Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences
with a specic set of beliefs. MEU is dened below.
Denition 3.1 We say that a preference relation % on A (
) is Maxmin Expected Utility
(MEU) if there exists a closed convex set of probability distributions, P, on 
 such that pref-
erences may be represented by the function
V (a) = min
p2P
Z


a (!) dp (!) .
Furthermore, if for each p 2 P, we write pR for its marginal distribution on R and p (j) for
the distribution on S  T conditional on the realization r, and we set
PR := fq 2 (R) : q = pR for some p 2 Pg ,
Pr := fq0 2 (S  T ) : q0 = p (jr) for some p 2 Pg
then we say P satises the rectangularity property of Epstein and Schneider (2003) with respect
to the ex ante randomization, if
P = fq(r)p (s; tjr) j p (jr) 2 Pr; q 2 PRg :
For a MEU decision maker with a rectangular set of priors, it follows that
V (a) : = min
p2P
Z


a (!) dp (!)
= min
q2PR
Z
R

min
q02Pr
Z
ST
a (r; s; t) dq0 (s; t)

dq (r) :
Example 3.1 Suppose R = fr1; r2g with  (r1) =  (r2) = 12 ; S = fs1; s2g ; T = ft1; t2g and
 (t1) =  (t2) =
1
2
; where  (resp. ) denotes the probability of the ex-ante (resp. ex-post)
randomizing device. This models a situation where the ex-post and ex-ante randomizing devices
are independent tosses of a fair coin. Dene Q  (S  T ) by
Q = fq 2 (S  T ) : q(s1; t) = 1
4
  
2
; q(s2; t) =
1
4
+

2
:      g:
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Let the decision-makers set of priors be given by:
P = fp 2 (
) : p (r; s; t) =  (r) qr (s; t) : qr 2 Qg :
By construction, the set is rectangular with respect to the partition dened by the ex-ante
randomization, i.e. r1  S  T; r2  S  T . As the following result shows these preferences
satisfy our axioms, thus, inter alia, demonstrating that they are consistent.
Proposition 3.4 If the DM has MEU preferences with beliefs represented by P then he will
satisfy R-dynamic consistency (A.2.2) R-consequentialism (A.2.3) and Ellsberg Ambiguity-
Aversion (A.2.5). He will be indi¤erent to ex-ante randomization but will have a strict prefer-
ence for ex-post randomization.
Proof. Dene acts a; b 2 A (S) by:
a (r; s; t) =
8><>: 1 if s = s1;0 if s = s2; b (r; s; t) =
8><>: 0 if s = s1;1 if s = s2:
Let ~p denote a typical element of P : By construction ~p has the form
~p (r; s; t) =
8><>:
1
2
 
1
4
  
2

if hs; ti = hs1; t1i or hs1; t2i ;
1
2
 
1
4
+ 
2

if hs; ti = hs2; t1i or hs2; t2i ;
for r 2 fr1; r2g :
The expected value of a with respect to ~p is
E~pa = ~p (r1; s1; t1)+ ~p (r2; s1; t1)+ ~p (r1; s1; t2)+ ~p (r2; s1; t2) =
1
2
  : Thus minp2P Epa = 12  :
Similarly minp2P Epb = 12   ; hence a s b:
Preferences for Ex-post Randomization and Ellsberg Ambiguity Aversion Let C
denote the event t = t1; and let E denote the event s = s1: Consider the ex-post randomization
aCb; then aCb (r; s1; t1) = aCb (r; s2; t2) = 1 and aCb = 0 otherwise.
Thus E~paCb = ~p (r1; s1; t1)+~p (r2; s1; t1)+~p (r1; s2; t2)+~p (r2; s2; t2) =
 
1
4
  
2

+
 
1
4
+ 
2

= 1
2
;
(recall ~p denotes a generic element of P). Hence V (aCb) = minp2P EpaCb = 12 > V (a) =
V (b) = 1
2
  ; which implies that the individual displays a strict preference for ex-post ran-
domization. Since for x  y; xCy s yCx  xEy s yEx; Ellsberg ambiguity aversion is also
satised.
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Indi¤erence to Ex-ante Randomization Consider the ex-ante randomization ar1b: Then
ar1b (r1; s1; t) = a
r1b (r2; s2; t) = 1 and ar1b = 0 otherwise. As before let ~p denote a generic
element of P: Then ~p (r1; s1; t1) = ~p (r1; s1; t2) = 12
 
1
4
  r1

and ~p (r2; s2; t1) = ~p (r2; s2; t2) =
1
2
 
1
4
+ r2

:
Thus V (ar1b) = minp2P Epar1b = 12 :minqr12QEpa
r1b (r1; s; t) +
1
2
:minqr22QEpa
r1b (r2; s; t)
= 1
2
min 6r16
 
1
4
  r1

+ 1
2
min 6r26
 
1
4
+ r2

= 1
2
 
1
4
  + 1
2
 
1
4
   = 1
2
  :
Since V (a) = V (b) = V (ar1b), the individual is indi¤erent to ex-ante randomization.
R-Dynamic Consistency The beliefs are rectangular with respect to the partition created
by the ex-ante randomizing device. Thus by Epstein and Schneider (2003) they satisfy R-
dynamic consistency.
R-Consequentialism R-Consequentialism is clearly satised because the denition of the
conditional preferences makes no reference to outcomes in other states. Consider the event
fr1g, (for convenience we abbreviate fr1gST to fr1g). The set of updates of P conditional
on fr1g is Q. Conditional preferences are dened by:
a %fr1g b, min
q2Q
Eqa (r1; s; t) > min
q2Q
Eqb (r1; s; t) :
By inspection, preferences are independent of outcomes on the complement of fr1g : By similar
reasoning we can show that preferences conditional on fr2g are consequentialist.
It can be seen that this construction generalizes. Take a set of multiple prior preferences over
ST; which give a strict preference for ex-post randomization. Then extend them by imposing
rectangularity with respect to the partition created by the ex-ante randomizing device. The
result will be a set of preferences which satises our axioms. Thus a large class of multiple
prior preferences is compatible with our framework.
4 Example: A Paradox for the Smooth AmbiguityModel
In this section we study the ex-post ex-ante distinction in the context of the Epstein-KKM
debate about the smooth ambiguity model. Epstein (2010) provides examples of acts for which
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the intuitive ranking is incompatible with the representation by the smooth model proposed by
Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), (henceforth KKM). In response KKM have o¤ered
their own intuition for a di¤erent ranking of the same acts. We believe that making a distinction
between ex-ante and ex-post randomizations can clarify some of the issues in this debate.
Epsteins argument involves a toss of a fair coin. He does not specify whether this is to
be interpreted as an ex-ante or an ex-post randomization. To accommodate this we use the
symbol  to denote a 50:50 randomization without specifying whether it is ex-post or ex-ante.
Thus    denotes a randomization which yields  (resp.  ) if the coin shows heads (resp.
tails). In terms of our notation, Epsteins thought experiment may be expressed as follows.
Example 4.1 (Epstein (2010)) You are given two urns, numbered 1 and 2, each containing
50 balls that are either black or white. In addition you are told that the two are generated
independently, for example, they are set up by administrators from opposite sides of the planet
who have never been in contact with one another. One ball will be drawn from each urn. In
addition there is a fair coin which can come up either heads or tails:
Consider the following acts f^ (resp. ~f) is a bet on the event that a black ball will be drawn
from urn 1 (resp. 2), f^  ~f is an act which selects f^ if the coin comes up heads and ~f if tails;
g is a bet on the event that a white ball will be drawn from urn 1: Finally a^ (resp. ~a) is a
randomization which selects f^ (resp. ~f) if the coin shows heads and g otherwise.
To interpret this in our framework assume that the ex-ante and ex-post randomizations are
independent tosses of a fair coin. Let R = fr1; r2g and T = ft1; t2g ; where r1 denotes the
event that the ex-ante coin shows heads etc. The grand state space is 
 = R  S  T , where
S = fb1; w1g  fb2; w2g. The colour of the ball drawn from the rst (respectively, second) urn
is denoted by s1 2 fb1; w1g (respectively, s2 2 fb2; w2g).
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The various acts from Epsteins thought experiment may be represented as follows:
Bets for Experiment 2
(s1; s2) 2 S
(b1; b2) (b1; w2) (w1; b2) (w1; w2)
f^ x x y y
~f x y x y
f^  ~f x x  y y  x y
g y y x x
a^ x  y x  y y  x y  x
~a x  y y x y  x
where x > y:
Epstein (2010) argues for the preference ranking f^  ~f  f^  ~f and a^  ~a and shows that
this ranking of acts cannot be represented by the smooth model, since a^ = f^  g and ~a = ~f  g.
In order to support this ranking Epstein (2010) writes:17
Symmetry suggests indi¤erence between f^ and ~f . If it is believed that the com-
positions of the two urns are unrelated, then f^ and ~f do not hedge one another.
If, as in the multiple-priors model, hedging ambiguity is the only motivation for
randomizing, then we are led to the rankings f^  ~f  f^  ~f . Ambiguity aversion
suggests a^  ~a.
In their reply, Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2012) do not question the result of Ep-
stein, but challenge his intuition:18
Epstein argued that f^  ~f  f^  ~f and a^  ~a are natural for a strictly ambiguity
averse individual. .... We agree with the intuition for [a^  ~a], but disagree that
f^  ~f  f^  ~f is natural for an ambiguity averse individual and think there is
good reason to expect f^  ~f  f^  ~f . ... The evaluation of f^  ~f depends on
the colour compositions of both urns, but has half the exposure to the uncertainty
about the ratio in each urn compared to f^ and ~f . Recall that the determination of
the two urn compositions is viewed as independent. The act f^  ~f thus diversies
17In the quotation, the notation of events and acts has been adapted to the one used in this paper.
18As in the previous quotation, we have adapted the notation to the one used in this paper.
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the individuals exposure across the urns: it provides a hedging of the two indepen-
dent ambiguities in the same sense as diversifying across bets on independent risks
provides a hedging of the risks. To an individual who is averse to ambiguity (i.e., to
subjective uncertainty about relative likelihoods), such diversication is naturally
valuable.
Epsteins argument that the indi¤erence between f and ~f cannot be improved upon by
a randomization because the compositions of the two urns are unrelated suggests that he
views the randomization as occurring ex-ante, i.e. f^  ~f = f^ fhg ~f in our notation. In contrast,
the hedging argument of KMM refers explicitly to the (ex-post) equivalence of the lottery
outcomes xy and yx in states (b; w) and (w; b), respectively, achieved by the randomization.
This suggests that they view the randomization f^  ~f as occurring ex-post, in our notation f^  ~f
is equal to f^ft1g ~f . In combination with our analysis, this example shows that the smooth model
can accommodate ex-post randomizations, however it appears to have di¢ culties with ex-ante
randomizations.
5 Related Research
Much of the recent literature in this area is not directly comparable since they tend to use the
AA model while we use a Savage framework.19 We made this modelling choice since we believe
that when studying attitudes to randomization it is important to model the randomizing device
in the same way as other uncertainties.
Bade Bade (2015) has a related argument concerning experiments on ambiguity-aversion.
She argues that subjects may use randomizing devices, which are part of the experimental
design, to reduce their exposure to ambiguity. As a result the experiment may understate
actual ambiguity-aversion. An example would be the commonly used Becker-de Groot-Marshak
mechanism.
Consider an experiment which involves asking subjects a number of questions, one of which
is selected randomly for payment. The question Bade asks is whether subjects will make the
same answer as in a situation where they faced a single question for certain. It is well known
that the answer is yes for expected utility preferences but no for some common types of non-
expected utility preferences, Karni and Safra (1987). Bade investigates how these results can
be extended to a class of ambiguity-averse preferences.
19There is also an earlier literature, see for instance, Brewer (1963) or Fellner (1963).
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This is related to the question studied in the present paper. Consider the variant of the
one-urn Ellsberg problem from the introduction. Recall R (respectively, B or Y ) denotes the
bet that pays $100 if a red (respectively, black or yellow) ball is drawn from the urn. Then an
ambiguity-averse individual who has a strict preference for randomization may well have the
preference
BfhgY  R  B s Y;
where as before h denotes the event that a fair coin shows heads when tossed and BfhgY
denotes the act which pays o¤ on B (resp. Y ) if the coin shows heads (resp. tails). Thus the
subject prefers R to B and R to Y . However if (s)he is asked to express a preference in both of
these situations and told that one of these choices will be played out for real with probability
1
2
then choosing B in the rst choice and Y in the second is equivalent to choosing BfhgY
which is strictly preferred to R. Hence the subject will express the opposite choices in the
situation where one decision is randomly played for real, compared to the situation in which
(s)he was asked either question in isolation. Thus in experiments on ambiguity it is necessary
to be careful when introducing extra uncertainty.
Bade does not explicitly model the timing of randomizations. Our results suggest that if
an explicit temporal structure is imposed on her model the distortion of preferences would
arise with ex-post randomizations. It may be the case that subjects are not told the order of
resolution of uncertainty. In this case the result would depend on the subjectsbelief about
whether the randomizations were ex-post or ex-ante.
Kuzmics Kuzmics (2015) argues that if a rational individual is ambiguity-averse, it will not
be possible to demonstrate his/her ambiguity aversion experimentally. The paper starts by
assuming a preference for ex-post randomization induced by hedging complementary acts. The
AA axiom on reversal of order of randomization is then invoked to deduce a strict preference
for ex-ante randomization. An extension to the basic argument shows that even asking sub-
jects a nite sequence of questions is not capable of distinguishing ambiguity-averse and SEU
preferences.
There are a number of di¤erences between his theoretical framework and that in the present
paper. Firstly he assumes that individuals are committed to their randomizations. This is
reminiscent of our distinction between ex-ante and ex-post randomizations. An ex-post ran-
domization embodies a form of commitment, since it is not possible to change actions after the
randomization. Secondly the paper uses an AA framework. This involves making a particular
modelling choice about which uncertainties are modelled using the state space and which are
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modelled by the AA scaling probabilities. It is not clear that the same result could be obtained
with a di¤erent modelling choice.
We contend that the crucial assumption is the reversal of order of randomizations which
rules out most of the issues studied in the present paper. One might note that none of the
standard theories of ambiguity-aversion satisfy this assumption. As already noted, the spaces
of ex-ante and ex-post randomizations are di¤erent mathematical objects. There is therefore
no compelling reason to impose indi¤erence between them.
Saito Saito (2013) characterizes preference for randomization in terms of preferences over
sets of acts. In his model there is a single randomization. The subject is not told whether the
randomization occurs ex-ante or ex-post. Hence they must then form subjective beliefs about
the timing of the randomization. Saito axiomatizes preferences which depend on a parameter
which reects subjective beliefs as to whether the randomization is ex-post or ex-ante.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the Rai¤a argument for randomization as a response to ambiguity. It shows
that preferences which are not indi¤erent to randomization must be dynamically inconsistent.
If one views dynamic consistency as a fundamental normative principle, then these results
suggest there is no normative theory of ambiguity aversion in which there is a strict preference
for randomization.
Much of the previous literature on ambiguity has explicitly or implicitly assumed ambiguity-
aversion. However our results in Section 3.1 do not assume ambiguity-aversion. Thus we
conclude that an ambiguity-loving individual would also be indi¤erent to ex-ante randomization
if they are R-dynamically consistent. Assumption 2.5 does imply a form of ambiguity-aversion.
However the opposite strict preference could be taken to be a characterization of ambiguity-
loving behaviour. If such an assumption were made we could conclude that an ambiguity-lover
would be indi¤erent to ex-ante randomization and averse to ex-post randomization.
From the descriptive point of view there is little evidence that experimental subjects are
dynamically consistent. Thus there is no logical reason why one cannot assume strict preference
for randomization in a descriptive theory. However the experimental evidence does not suggest
that individuals express a strict preference for ex-ante randomization, Dominiak and Schnedler
(2011). There is also evidence against a preference for ex-post randomization, see Eichberger,
Oechssler, and Schnedler (2015). Reconciling these experimental results with the theory is a
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topic for future research.
The preference for randomization argument is most plausible when applied to problems of
balls and urns. In an experiment like the 2-ball Ellsberg urn it is reasonably clear that betting
on red is a complementary act to betting on black. In real ambiguous decisions there are often
no easily available acts which pay-o¤ in the complementary events. Consider, for instance,
decisions such as whether it is worth paying a large amount of money to protect against an
uncertain environmental threat or whether to invade a rogue state which may have weapons
of mass destruction. In such cases randomization is not obviously attractive. Ball and urn
experiments capture some aspects of reality. However they also leave important things out.
In the convex capacity model it is not possible to have a strict preference for randomization.
In more general models of ambiguity, such as multiple priors, one may or may not have a strict
preference for randomization. Both preferences are possible, and which one uses is a modelling
choice. We anticipate that some researchers will continue to assume a strict preference for
randomization. The price of doing so is dynamic inconsistency.
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